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ABSTRACT: 
 Due to Globalization outsourcing of SoC designs either for verification, testing and 
fabrication has become inevitable. Modern System on chip (SoC) is complex process. Modern 
SoC‟s can be designed time effectively and cost effectively with the help of third party Intellectual 
Property (IP) core vendors. Various processors cores (like ARM, Power PC), communication 
controllers (CAN, Zigbee) and control cores (PWM, Analog comparator) will get incorporated into 
SoC‟s, which are supplied by different vendors. The original SoC manufacturers are IP integrators, 
targeting a particular application. 
In this process, various issues like IP protection, IP rights and problem of malicious IP‟s 
will arise. Recent addition in this list is Hardware Trojans (HT). HT‟s can be included by rogue 
designer in design house or at overseas fabrication factories. The objective of these HT‟s includes 
manipulating the functionality of the chip, leaking confidential information and destroying the 
system. HT‟s included in the design phase must be weeded out during verification phase. Still now, 
there is no concrete method or golden rule in the existing verification framework to detect the 
HT‟s. Various verification metrics like code coverage, functional coverage and verification 
methodologies like OVM or UVM will be helpful in detecting HT‟s. Formal verification is also 
useful. A comprehensive framework using all verification metrics is very much required to detect 
HT‟s. We will address this issue in our thesis.   
Secondly, static timing analysis (STA) and power analysis (PA) can be used to detect HT‟s 
included at both design phase and also in fabrication. In our proposed framework, we will 
incorporate verification metrics, formal verification, STA and PA to detect HT‟s.  
In this report, we apply DFT techniques and standard verification metrics to detect the 
hardware Trojans. The microprocessors and cryptographic designs are most vulnerable for 
vi 
 
hardware Trojan attacks. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and RSA Trojan benchmarks 
from Trust Hub are used to verify the existing test principles like stuck at fault (SAF), path delay 
faults (PDF) are capable of detecting Trojans in Benchmarks. Results and analysis is presented in 
this report. 
Also Novel Trojan Benchmarks designs were proposed to eliminate the existing 
weaknesses in AES Benchmarks. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION: 
 
HARDWARE SECURITY: 
 
 Now-a-days due to advancement in technology stealing of confidential information 
from cryptographic cores has become a very easy task. The technology revolution has fetched 
various possibilities for these cyber-crimes. An Integrated Circuit manufactured is always 
desired to be authentic which means it performs only operations originally it is intended to do 
which is quite a nightmare these days. Integrated Circuits subject to weak design logics and 
implementation are more vulnerable to these Hardware Security attacks. The adversary can 
have the control over the IC by introducing a malicious block of additional hardware in the 
IC that will facilitate the requirement of the adversary. The adversary can introduce Hardware 
Trojan (HT) at any level of abstraction. The insertion of trojans raised serious concerns 
regarding possible threats to defence systems. US Defence Science Board reports confirm the 
malicious insertions into the chips used in military systems [1]. 
 It is very difficult for a designer to design all the modules of his design from the 
ground level as it is a time consuming process and also the industry may miss a market 
window due to the delay. Also it is very difficult to afford managing a foundry. Hence the 
industry is forced to outsource their design for fabrication. Also they purchase IP cores from 
third party IP vendors. Here comes the loop hole for the intruders to gain access over our 
design. The IP cores form the vendors may not be trustworthy and are HT inserted.    
 Detection of these HTs is not an easy task by inspection method as each IC contains 
billions of transistors which would cost a life time even to count them. Hence the objective of 
development of various Verification Metrics that improve hardware security has become 
inevitable. Verification is a pre-silicon process and is to be done prior to fabrication. Some of 
the verification metrics include Formal Verification, Coverage metrics, Model Checking and 
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Equivalence checking. Every technique cannot detect all types of HTs. Each technique has its 
own context of application. 
HARDWARE TROJANS: 
 Hardware Trojans have been gaining a lot of attention in past few years by researchers 
and governmental organisations as these are mainly built to gain access to secure devices and 
their data. Hardware Trojans can be inserted into 3PIPs by IP vendors during IP design to 
steal security information/data from other IPs in the system. Detection of such Trojans is 
extremely difficult since there is no known golden model for 3PIPs as IP vendors usually 
provides specification and source code, both of which may contain Trojans. The conventional 
side-channel techniques for IC trust are not applicable to IP trust. When a Trojan exists in an 
IP core, all the fabricated ICs will contain Trojans. The only trusted component would be the 
specification from the SOC designer which defines the function, primary input and output, 
and other information about the 3PIP that they intend to use in their systems. Automation 
tools from vendors like Synopsys, Cadence etc, which are generally trusted [2]. Also world‟s 
supreme powers rely on defence electronic equipments [3] that needs to be authentic always. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company x Company y 
Figure 1-1 Inclusion of 3PIP’s (malicious) in SoC  
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 A Trojan can be very well hidden during the normal functional operation of the 3PIP 
supplied as register transfer level (RTL) code. A large industrial-strength IP core can include 
thousands of lines of code. Identifying the few lines of RTL code in a soft IP core that 
represent a Trojan is an extremely challenging task. Cryptographic cores are most vulnerable 
to the side channel attacks[4]. 
In fact, Hardware Trojans are alterations to the original circuits, which lets the 
intruder to access the hardware. These malicious inclusions in a chip can take many forms. It 
will be easier to identify these malicious inclusions if a proper classification of HTs is done. 
Hence a comprehensive Taxonomy would increase the effectiveness of application of 
detection techniques. Hardware Trojans can be easily inserted at RTL stage rather than 
manufacturing stage[6].  
 One of the way in which Hardware Trojans can be defined is, “Hardware Trojan (HT) 
is a malicious modification in the circuitry of an integrated circuit which is completely 
characterized by its physical representation and its behaviour”. 
 
Figure 1-2 Trojan Structure 
These Trojans try to bypass or disable the security fence of a system. It may leak 
valuable and confidential information and sometimes they could destroy the entire chip or 
components of it.  
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 Depending up on the Physical, Action and Activation Characteristics a detailed flow 
is presented in the figure 1-3 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1.3.  
 
 Physical Characteristics category describes physical changes that can be manifested in 
the design. The type category is partitioned in to Parametric and Functional classes. The 
Functional class depicts the Trojans that are physically introduced by addition or deletion of 
additional circuitry. The Parametric class depicts the Trojans that are realized by introducing 
alterations in existing wires and logic. The Distribution class describes about the location of 
the HT in the physical layout. Sometimes the adversary is forced to regenerate the layout to 
include Trojan, which is described by the structure category. Any changes in the chips 
physical design would change the power dissipation and delay characteristics of the chip that 
would facilitate the detection of its corruption easily[2]. 
     Trojan 
classification 
    Physical 
Characteristics 
    Activation 
Characteristics 
      Action 
Characteristics 
Distribution 
   Structure 
       Size 
      Type 
Functional Parametric 
Externally         
activated 
Internally         
activated 
Always On 
Conditional 
   Antenna 
     Sensor 
   Transmit 
Information 
     Modify 
Specification 
Modify        
Function 
Change 
Disable 
Layout 
Change 
Layout 
Same 
Logic Sensor 
Figure 1-3 Detailed Trojan Taxonomy [2]  
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 Activation Characteristics describes the criteria or condition on which the Trojan 
triggers its functionality in payload. These can be externally activated by a sensor or an 
antenna from outside world or internally activated. The HT triggered internally can be on 
always and can modify the functionality at any instant. Or they can be activated 
corresponding to a triggering criterion.  
 Action Characteristics corresponds to the malicious action of the HT inserted chip. 
The disruptive action may be like transmitting or leaking information, modifying 
functionality and specification. They can either modify the functionality or even disable the 
functionality. Modification of functionality is done either by addition of redundant logic or by 
bypassing the original logic that directly affects the integrity of the circuit. Some of the 
instances are like modification of data stored in memory or bypassing a computational 
operation. Other action characteristic is modification of specification which means the 
ASIC‟s parametric properties like clock timing and power are affected. This is achieved by 
modifying the wires and number of transistors in the design.  
IMPORTANCE OF TROJAN BENCHMARKS: 
 In general Third-Party IP cores are available in three categories namely Hard IP, Firm 
IP and Soft IP cores. Hard IP cores are defined at physical levels that are in the form of layout 
or GDSII file format. Firm IP cores are synthesized for specific libraries. Soft IP cores are 
described in Hardware Description Language (HDL) are very popular due to their flexibility 
that they can exist both as netlists and HDL code and hence it provides greater flexibility for 
the adversary to include malicious behaviour at this level. Also inserting a code doesn‟t cost 
but modifying or adding additional circuitry to Hard IP however is an economic issue. As the 
Industry standard IP cores comprises of thousands of lines of HDL code it is very difficult to 
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detect and small alteration or inclusion of a malicious behaviour. Hence Soft IP cores are the 
means by which the attackers make use to serve his purpose. 
 Analysis of Trojan inserted Benchmark designs has drawn much attention. These 
Trojan benchmarks will let us familiar with their physical, action and activation 
characteristics of Hardware Trojans. As it is evident that not all types of Hardware Trojans 
can be detected by a single technique, using these Trojan inserted Benchmarks a 
comprehensive flow of detection techniques, that describes the application of a particular 
technique on a specific design at a specific instant, can be developed.  Hence design, analysis 
and study of various Hardware Trojan Benchmarks have gained attention of verification 
engineers. 
1.2. MOTIVATION:  
 Due to globalization, various stages of System on Chip (SoC) development has taken 
a new face where the there is a flexibility for the industry to opt different levels of 
abstractions from different sources. This has made the SoC development comparatively a less 
time consuming process than earlier.  
 This has somehow made the job easy and difficult as well. Outsourcing of the design 
for fabrication or verification or testing may cost the loss of authenticity of the design. For 
instance, a typical SoC organisation is shown in the figure. Not all the blocks are designed by 
the same company as it leads to missing of a market window where they may run out of time 
and loose the current existing technology. Hence they opt for Intellectual Property (IP) cores 
from third-party IP vendors. Here comes the problem about the authenticity and trust-
worthiness of the IP cores. The 3-PIP vendor may not supply us with a trust-worthy IP core 
and these IP cores are to be subjected for various verification techniques to trace out 
Hardware Trojans inserted, if any. This has motivated for the current study. 
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1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: 
The objective of this dissertation is study various classes of hardware Trojans nad 
investigate various Hardware Trojan Detection Techniques available and propose a new 
comprehensive approach using the available techniques. To implement the idea, various AES 
Benchmarks from Trust-hub were taken and analysed to implement various Hardware 
Detection Techniques. Also the strengths and weaknesses associated with them were 
analysed and a novel benchmark design is proposed to overcome their weaknesses. Synopsys 
DC™ 2008 version[20] is used for entire research. 
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ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS: 
The thesis organization flow is listed below 
 Chapter 2: This chapter focuses on various simulation-based Hardware Trojan 
detection techniques using verification and corresponding literature survey. 
 Chapter 3: This chapter focuses on detailed description of Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) and RSA Benchmark designs. 
 Chapter 4: This chapter details strengths and weaknesses of AES and RSA 
benchmarks. 
 Chapter 5: This chapter proposes Novel AES Trojan benchmark designs of whose 
malicious behaviour and the cause is very difficult to detect using existing verification 
techniques. 
 Chapter 6: This chapter describes possible future work and conclusion of work done. 
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2. VERIFICATION METRICS FOR TROJAN DETECTION 
 
2.1. SYSTEM ON CHIP VERIFICATION FOR TROJAN DETECTION 
2.2. VERIFICATION v/s TEST 
2.3. VERIFICATION METRICS 
 2.3.1. FORMAL VERIFICATION 
 2.3.2. COVERAGE METRICS 
2.4. HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
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2.1. SYSTEM ON CHIP VERIFICATION FOR TROJAN DETECTION: 
 There is no “Golden bullet” for detecting all classes of HTs. A specific technique 
should be incorporated for detection of specific class of HTs. Detection prior to fabrication at 
RTL level could save significant time and man power. 
Verification metrics are used in general to verify the correctness of the design prior to 
fabrication. It is a challenging task for the verification engineer to detect the intruder included 
malicious behaviour.  
2.2. VERIFICATION v/s TEST: 
 Verification and Testing are equally important in a System-on-Chip (SoC) design as 
they both contribute to the flaw less design both in physical and functional. However both 
have significant differences like verification is an analytic approach to verify whether the 
functionality of the design is matching with the specification or not. Unlike verification 
testing ensures the fabricated device from the netlists is physically flawless. Various 
differences between verification and testing are shown in Table 1-1. 
Table 2-1 Verification versus test 
VERIFICATION TESTING 
1. It accounts for the correctness of the 
design. 
1. It accounts for manufacturing flaws 
associated with physical design. 
2. It is a pre-silicon process 2.  It is a post-silicon process 
3. It accounts for quality of design prior 
to manufacture 
3.  It accounts for quality of device 
4. It is exercised only once on the design 4.  Each IC fabricated has to undergo 
testing. 
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2.3. VERIFICATION METRICS: 
Various Simulation-based verification metrics include Formal Verification and Functional 
Verification.  
2.3.1.  FORMAL VERIFICATION: 
 Formal verification is an approach by which correctness of various properties is 
verified. Formal verification is categorised into Model Checking and Equivalence checking. 
MODEL CHECKING AND EQUIVALENCE CHECKING: 
Model Checking: 
 Model Checking is done by writing the specification of design as temporal logic and 
verifying them with the design. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Figure represents the model checking for specification against its design. If Model check 
passes then it implies that the specification versus design match passed. In case, if the model 
check fails then the design is to be redesigned  to ensure security [9][17]. 
 
SPECIFICATION DESIGN 
MODEL CHECK 
YES NO 
Figure 2-2-1 Model Check block diagram  
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Equivalence Checking: 
 Equivalence checking verifies the equivalence between RTL design and netlists to 
ensure whether the functionality and timing of RTL design is matching with its netlists or not. 
This is illustrated in the figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Figure represents Equivalence checking on RTL versus netlists. If the Equivalence test 
passes there is no issue if it fails the RTL and netlists should be re-examined for mismatch. 
2.3.2. COVERAGE METRICS: 
 Coverage Metrics are those by which means a RTL design is verified. These metrics 
can ensure the correctness of the design with respect to functionality and also contribute for 
detecting malicious blocks, if any. 
Coverage metrics are broadly classified into 
SYNTHESIS 
E
Q
U
IV
A
L
E
N
C
E
 
RTL CONSTRAINTS 
NETLISTS CONSTRAINTS 
Figure 2-2 Equivalence Check block diagram  
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 Code Coverage 
 Functional Coverage 
CODE COVERAGE:  
 Code Coverage will report the effectiveness of the test-bench. In general none can 
write in hand manually all the possible input combinations for inputs whose widths are larger. 
Code coverage will report what parts of the design are covered and left uncovered by the test-
bench. This feature can help the verification Engineers in detecting Hardware Trojans. Code 
Coverage is further sub divided into 
 Line Coverage 
 Statement Coverage 
 Condition Coverage 
 Block Coverage 
 Expression Coverage 
 FSM Coverage 
 Toggle Coverage 
Out of all Toggle coverage and FSM coverage has gained Prominence with respect to the 
area of Hardware Security as the pin associated with malicious block will not toggle until the 
Trojan triggering condition occurs and this can be dealt using Toggle Coverage Report. Also 
the malicious block will try to bypass the original FSM states which get caught in FSM 
coverage. 
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FUNCTIONAL COVERAGE: 
 A simple test-bench written in Verilog coding style cannot detect the functional flaws 
in the design on which the test-bench is intended to test for. This is because the test bench 
may or may not correspond to the inputs that trigger the unwanted behaviour. Hence their 
functionality should be tested by writing a powerful test-bench where the inputs 
corresponding to the malicious trigger condition is necessary. 
Functional Coverage is further categorised into  
 Control Oriented Functional coverage 
 Data Oriented Functional Coverage 
CONTROL ORIENTED FUNCTIONAL COVERAGE: 
 Control Oriented Functional Coverage is one of the verification metrics based on 
assertions. The design behaviour‟s temporal aspect can be verified using this. Assertions are 
written in System Verilog Language defining the behaviour of the control pins, the coverage 
can be achieved. 
 It plays vital role in identifying the functional flaws very easily compared to data 
oriented coverage using minimum lines. 
DATA ORIENTED FUNCTIONAL COVERAGE: 
 Data oriented Functional Coverage deals with specific values, transitions, or 
combination of both that the variable receives. It keeps track of the data throughout the 
simulation.  
16 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Data Oriented Coverage Block Diagram  
In this the exact values that the variable is supposed to receive are taken in a bin and the 
variable is subjected to verification for the values is actually receives versus the values it 
should actually receive (values stored in bins).  
In the figure 2-3 the reference model actually holds the bins that store the values that a 
variable likely to hit for and the DUT is verified against these values. The scoreboard record 
corresponding score. The score is recorded as a hit and mis-hit count. Hit count corresponds 
to the matched data values of the data values occurred against the data values in bins. mis-hit 
corresponds to the mismatched value 
2.4.  HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: 
 There are already existing comprehensive flow of Trojan detection techniques for 
various classes of Trojans [7][8]. Hardware Trojan Detection techniques use verification, 
testing, timing fingerprints and side-channel analysis [9] [10] [11].   Detecting Hardware 
Trojans in third party IP core using conventional verification techniques is not as easy as it is 
said. Xuehui Zhang and Mohammad Tehranipoor of University of Connecticut in their paper, 
case study: Detecting Hardware Trojans in Third-Party Digital IP Cores have presented a 
study on difficulties associated with Trojan detection. They proposed a detection flow in 
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which they used model checking and equivalence checking in their techniques to reduce the 
suspicious signals in RS232 Trojan benchmark designs[13]. 
 According to them the detection is carried out in two phases where in the first phase 
the third party IP is subjected to formal verification and coverage analysis. They used around 
five different test-benches to conduct coverage analysis. If formal verification and coverage 
analysis fails to detect the inserted Trojans then the design is tested with test patterns 
generated by ATPG. If the coverage appears to be 100 %, then it is Trojan free otherwise it is 
considered as Trojan inserted. These steps identify the suspicious signals. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Test-bench generation, suspicious signals identification and 
analysis flow [T]  
  Second phase is analysis of suspicious signals. In this phase they tried to 
remove the redundant circuitry by equivalence checking theorems and testing the design for 
untestable stuck-at-faults using sequential ATPG. If stuck-at-faults are untestable implies that 
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the outputs corresponding to the design with 100 % coverage will match with the one with 
less than 100 % coverage.  
 Trey Reece and William H. Robinson in their paper  Analysis of Data-Leak Hardware 
Trojans in AES Cryptographic Circuits a detailed study to demonstrate the impact of the 
Trojans inserted on area and Leakage power.  
 They have taken 21 AES Trojan inserted Benchmarks from trust-hub[12] repository 
to carry out Area and Power Analysis on them. They mentioned that the area footprint is in 
the range of -6,018 to 6,506 square micrometres. Out of the 21 AES benchmarks they 
reported only half of them increased the area that too not much significantly, which means 
that the impact of the Hardware Trojans inserted on the area is less significant. 
 
Figure 2-5 Difference in areas of AES Benchmarks [14] 
 The numbers on the x-axis indicate the benchmark number. Out of all AES 
benchmarks they reported that AES-T2100 has highest negative difference and AES-T1700 
has highest positive difference. According to their work AES-T600 benchmark has literally 
reported the same area as that of the Trojan free benchmark. This makes the approach of 
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considering the area overhead for Trojan detection very uncertain as the impact of the 
redundant malicious block over the area is insignificant. 
 Also they provided a detailed study on leakage power of twenty one AES 
benchmarks. The details regarding the power values are shown in the figure. The values 
reported for the leakage power analysis didn‟t report any even spread like area analysis. 
According to them the maximum obtained leakage power footprint is 47.5 microwatts and the 
minimum obtained footprint is of 6.9 microwatts. 
 
 
Figure 2-6 Difference in leakage power of AES Benchmarks [ 14] 
 Michael Bilzor, Ted Huffmire, Cynthia Irvine, and Tim Levin in their paper 
evaluating Security Requirements in a General-Purpose Processor by Combining Assertion 
Checkers with Code Coverage they enhanced an existing method in order to create dynamic 
checkers based on assertions[9]. Also they developed a checker-generator tool called psl2hdl 
that converts Property Specification Language to Hardware Description Language. However 
verification engineers are already using this assertion based functional check, these authors 
extended their work for general-purpose processors 
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Figure 2-7 Difference in Dynamic power of AES Benchmarks [ 14] 
.  
Yier Jin and Yiorgos Makris in their work presented a Hardware Trojan detection 
technique based on path-delay finger printing. They tried to validate the authenticity of any 
design based on their delay finger prints[6]. Also in their work they demonstrated 
Combinational Trojan architecture, Sequential Trojan architecture and existing difference 
between them. 
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Figure 2-8 Architecture of Combinational Trojan [6] 
  In the figure NOR-gate is redundant corresponding to the trigger condition 
{00}. The existence of gate doesn‟t change the output corresponding to the triggered case. 
The payload monitors the control signal (CTRL) and interrupt (INT) signals and gets 
activated when the control signal (CTRL) and interrupt (INT) is at low voltage levels. 
Combinational Trojan design comprises of only combinational gates. Unlike Combinational 
Trojans, sequential Trojans do have at least one memory element. 
 
Figure 2-9 Architecture of Sequential Trojan [6] 
22 
 
 In the figure the malicious block is a k-bit counter that doesn‟t cause any functional 
flaw but manages to consume additional power than its original specification. They used 
Static timing Analysis tool to get the finger prints. However inclusion of malicious blocks in 
any design will affect the parametric specifications like delay and power. They key idea here 
is to take the path delay finger prints of the Golden (Trojan-Free) design and compare them 
with the Trojan inserted designs. 
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3. THE AES AND RSA ALGORITHMS 
 
3.1. AES 
3.2. RSA 
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3.1.  ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES): 
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a cryptographic security algorithm 
developed by National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) of United States in the 
year 2001 [wiki]. The AES algorithm encrypts electronic data into cipher data which again 
can be decrypted using the same key. The basic block diagram of AES is shown in fig: 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
The key size can be 128-bit, 192-bit or 256-bit and the block size is fixed of size 128-bit. 
AES works on the principle of substitution-permutation network [wiki]. Both encryption and 
decryption uses the same key. 
 
AES 
(encrypt) 
Plain text 
Key 
Cipher text 
AES 
(decrypt) 
Cipher text 
Key 
Plain text 
Figure 3-3-1 AES Encryption Block Diagram  
Figure 3-3-2 AES Decryption Block Diagram  
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STRUCTURE OF AES ALGORITHM:  
 AES encryption is done in ten rounds if the key size is of 128-bit, 12 rounds if 
the key size is about 192-bit and 14 rounds if the key is about 256-bit. All rounds are 
identical except the last one where the key addition is done. Various steps of AES algorithm 
are shown in the figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 3.3 depicts the overall structure of AES algorithm. The 128-bit key is 
expanded and the first four words of the key schedule are XORed with the input array before 
the start of round-processing. Also during decryption the same thing happens, that is the 
Round 2 
Round 10 
Addition of round key 
Round 1 
K 
E 
Y 
 
Cypher text 
Text 
Plain Text 
w0 –w3 
w4–w7 
w8 –w11 
w40 –w43 
Figure 3-3-3 AES encryption for 128-bit 
plain text 
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cypher text is XORed with the last four words of the key schedule. Key scheduling is based 
on an algorithm described in the later sections. 
ONE ROUND: 
 Each Round is comprised of four operations namely  
 Byte Substitution 
 Shift Rows 
 Mix Columns 
 Addition of Round Key 
 
The overall structure of each round is shown in figure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Byte Substitution 
Shift Rows 
Mix Columns 
Addition of round 
key 
Round Key 
One Round of 
Encryption 
Figure 3-4 various steps in one Round 
of AES[21] 
27 
 
BYTE SUBSTITUTION: 
 Each byte of the plain text is substituted with another byte from a look up 
table of size 16 X 16. In order to determine the substitute byte each input byte is divided into 
two 4-bit streams corresponding to the integers 0 to 15 and equivalent hexadecimal of 0 to F. 
Out of the two hexa-decimal values of the byte one is referenced as a row index and the other 
as column index. The look up table is constructed using GF(2
8
) arithmetic followed by bit 
scrambling. Byte Substitution step reduces the correlation between input plain text and 
cypher text.  
SHIFT ROWS LAYER: 
 The shift rows layer do not shift the first row of the state array, circularly 
shifts by one byte of the second row to left, third row two bytes to left and fourth row three 
bytes to left. 
[
            
            
            
            
] 
 
 
 
[
            
            
            
            
] 
SHIFT ROWS 
Figure 3-3-5 State vector 
matrix before and after shift 
rows operation  
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 Here the first column of the state vector matrix is the first four bytes of the input plain text 
and thus the result of this shift rows operation will scramble the order of the input block 
Bytes. 
MIX COLUMNS: 
 In this layer all the bytes of the columns will be substituted by 
corresponding bytes which are function of all bytes in the column. To be specific the function 
is the sum of double the byte, triple the next byte, the very next byte and the following byte. 
Mix column operation is depicted in the fig 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Corresponding transformation for encryption is given by 
[
   
   
   
   
]  =  [
        
        
        
        
]   [
   
   
   
   
] 
KEY EXPANSION: 
 The main idea behind key expansion is that a change in one bit of the key 
would affect the round key for many rounds. During encryption or decryption the original 
key is not directly given during each round but a 128-bit round key obtained from the original 
MIX COLUMN 
S00 S10 S20 S30 
c00 c10 c20 c30 Figure 3-3-6 Mix Column 
layer 
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key on its expansion is used at each round. In this process the state vector is XORed with the 
round key once for each round. 
 W0, W1, W2 and W4 are words of each 64-bit where W0 is obtained from first 
column (first four bytes) of the state vector matrix, W1 is obtained from the second column 
(next four bytes) of the state vector matrix and so on. 
 
 
[
         
         
          
          
] 
 
 
  
[        ] 
   
These are XORed bitwise with the input prior to round based processing. W0, W1, W2 and W4 
are expanded further into a 44-word key schedule each of 64-bit and each of the four 
subsequent words were applied to each round during key scheduling[21]. The key expansion 
process is illustrated in the figure. 
KEY EXPANSION LAYER 
Figure 3-3-7 Key Expansion  
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Figure 3-3-8 The Key Expansion Flow [21] 
  
 Except the first word in the new grouping, every other word is the result of 
XOR operation of its previous word with the corresponding word in the previous grouping. 
 
0  1  2  3  
 
 
  
 
 
8  9  10  11 
    
. . . . . .  
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3.2. RSA: 
 RSA is a popular public-key cryptosystems that ensures secure data 
transmission. It is named after the names of its designers, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and 
Leonard Adleman. RSA was first published in the year 1977.  
 Unlike AES, RSA Cryptosystem is asymmetric nature which means that 
encryption and decryption is not dictated by same key. Encryption is done using public key 
and decryption is done using a private key. The data is secured as long as the private key will 
be kept secret. The symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems are depicted in the figure. 
 
                                                                                                                
                                                                                                    
                                                                                                              
                                                                                               
  
Encrypt Decrypt 
Encrypt Decrypt 
Public Key 
Private Key 
Recipient Sender 
Recipient Sender 
Figure 3-9 Symmetric Cryptosystem (AES)  
Figure 3-10 Asymmetric Cryptosystem (RSA)  
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Figure illustrates the encryption-decryption process in symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptosystems.Public key can be shared with anyone but private key is shared only with the 
reciepent for whom data transmisiion is intended for. 
Various steps in RSA Algorithms are Key generation, Encryption and Decryption. 
KEY GENERATION: 
 Unlike symmetrical cryptosystems like AES, asymmetrical cryptosystems like RSA 
require computation of a pair of keys namely Public Key (Kpub) and Private Key (Kpr). Public 
Key and Private Key generation steps are as listed below. 
 Choose large distinct primes p and q ( Prime Numbers are only chosen because the 
can ensure randomness required for security purposes). 
 Evaluate n = p.q 
 Evaluate  ( )   ( )  ( ), where  ( )      and  ( )      
 Choose Kpub= e ∈ * ,2,…   (   )}, such that GCD[e,  ( )]=1 
 Evaluate Kpr=d such that d.e=1 mod  ( ). Here d is the private key. 
ENCRYPTION: 
If a person-A shares public key (n,e) with person-B and with private key d held secret. 
person-B sends message X to person-A as described below. 
X is to be converted into an integer x, such that 0 ≤ x < n and gcd(x, n) = 1. Then the 
encrypted cypher text is given by the equation 
Y = EKpub(X) = X
e
 mod n 
Where Y is the cypher text and EKpub represents encryption function. 
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DECRYPTION: 
 Given Private Key (Kpr) = d, the decrypted plain text is given by the equation 
X=DKpr(Y) = Y
d
 mod n 
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4. TROJAN BENCHMARKS AND THEIR STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES 
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4.3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF AES BENCHMARKS 
4.4. RSA BENCHMARKS 
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4.1. AES TROJAN BENCHMARKS: 
 
 Twenty one AES Trojan Benchmarks with various malicious behavior are taken from 
the trust-hub for analysis and detection of Trojans inserted in them using existing 
conventional Hardware Trojan detection techniques. The description of twenty one AES 
benchmarks is tabulated in the table. 
Table 4-1 AES Benchmarks Description 
Benchmark Effect Side-channel Description 
AES-T100 leak info Power The Trojan use pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to create a 
CDMA code sequence. CDMA sequence is forwarded to a leakage 
circuit to set up a covert power side-channel. PRNG initialized to pre-
defined value. (Always on Trojan) 
AES-T200 leak info Power Same as AES-T100 but, PRNG initialized to pre-defined text. (Always 
on Trojan). 
AES-T300 leak info power Trojan leaks a byte of the round key for each round of the key schedule. 
The leakage circuit is a shift register and loaded with alternating zeros 
and ones when Trojan is inactive. When Trojan leaks key, it results in 
additional dynamic power consumption. (Always on Trojan). 
AES-T400 leak info RF- signal Modulating an unused pin on a chip generates an RF signal to transmit 
the key bits. Trojan gets activated with the predefined input plaintext. 
AES-T500 DoS NA Trojan is triggered by pre-defined input and drains battery within a short 
duration. 
AES-T600 leak info Leakage current When a specific plaintext is given as input, the Trojan leaks the secret 
key through the leakage current. The leakage circuit consists of a shift 
register holding the secret key. 
AES-T700 leak info Power Same as AES-T100 but, Trojan trigger when pre-defined input is 
observed. 
AES-T800 leak info Power Same as AES-T100 but, Trojan trigger when pre-defined input is 
observed. 
AES-T900 leak info Power Same as AES-T100 but, Trojan trigger after 2
128 encryptions. 
AES-T1000 leak info Power Same as AES-T100 but, Trojan trigger when pre-defined input is 
observed. 
AES-T1100 leak info Power Same as AES-T100 but, Trojan trigger when pre-defined input is 
observed. 
AES-T1200 leak info Power Same as AES-T100 but, Trojan trigger after 2
128 encryptions. 
AES-T1300 leak info Power Trojan is triggered by specific input, it leaks key through increase in 
dynamic power. 
AES-T1400 leak info Power Trojan is triggered by input of specific sequence, it leaks key by increase 
in dynamic power. 
AES-T1500 leak info Power Trojan is triggered after 2
128 encryptions, leak key through an increase in 
dynamic power. 
AES-T1600 leak info RF-Radio signal Same as AES-T400 but, Trojan trigger when pre-defined input is 
observed. 
AES-T1700 leak info RF-Radio signal Same as AES-T400 but, Trojan trigger after 2
128 encryptions 
AES-T1800 DoS NA Trojan is triggered by pre-defined input and drains battery within a short 
duration. 
AES-T1900 DoS NA Trojan is triggered after 2
128 encryptions and drains battery within a short 
duration. 
AES-T2000 leak info Leakage current Trojan is triggered by pre-defined input and increases the leakage 
current. 
AES-T2100 leak info Leakage current Trojan is triggered after pre-defined number of encryptions and increases 
leakage current. 
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RF-Radio Frequency; DoS-Denial of Service; NA- Not Available 
From the table it is evident that the malicious behavior of the Benchmarks is either they leak 
the secret key or perform Denial of Service operation. Here the crypto core is actually AES 
integrated with a Trojan Side Channel (TSC) [6] that performs the malicious operation. The 
Trojan inserted AES module would likely appear as shown in figure. 
 
Figure 4-1 Trojan inserted AES [lin]  
L. Lin, M. Kasper, T. Güneysu, C. Paar and W. Burleson described the class of TSC 
introduced performs a known operation on the key so that the function is again inverted and 
applied to retrieve the secret key. The operations are depicted in the equations below 
C= e (K) 
e
-1
 (K) =C 
Where K is the key, C is the output of the Trojan Side Channel block and e is the malicious 
function that performs the malicious action. As the attacker is the designer of the core, he can 
easily retrieve back the original key by inverting the malicious function. They modelled the 
function e to model various Trojans.  
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Depending on the TSC function the benchmarks are categorized as follows 
 Those that perform Key leakage based on spread spectrum technique. 
 Those that perform Key leakage based on RF-Radio Transmission using Amplitude 
Modulation (AM). 
 Those that perform Denial of Service (DoS) operation using Shift register based 
rotation logic. 
 Those that perform Denial of Service (DOS) operation using a series of inverters that 
logic. 
CDMA based TSC: 
 The TSCs employ spread spectrum technique for key leakage. Using Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) scheme, the leakage of single bits is distributed over many clock 
cycles. 
 
Figure 4-2 CDMA based TSC implementation [lin]  
CDMA uses a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) to modulate the 
information. Likewise the TSC here uses an LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) which is 
a PRNG to modulate the key bits. In specific the key bits are XORed with the secret key. 
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Then the XOR modulated sequence is then transmitted to LC circuit so that a covert CDMA 
channel is set up in the power side channel. Since that attacker has the knowledge about the 
PRNG, the covert channel can be distinguished from the noise. The attacker decodes the 
covert channel by performing correlation demodulation technique. Among the twenty one 
benchmarks, AES-T100, AES-T200, AES-T700, AES-T800, AES-T900 AES-T1000, AES-
T1100 and AES-T1200 possesses the TSC that falls in this category[18][19]. In AES-T100 
the Trojan has been always active. In AES-T200 the Trojan is triggered up on the low reset. 
In remaining the Trojan gets triggered based on a criterion. The criterion may be either an 
encounter of a particular state or a sequence of states or after a particular number of 
encryptions. 
RF Transmission based TSC: 
 An unused pin on the chip is modulated to generate RF signal. Unused pin can be 
used as an RF transmitter to transmit the information to the adversary  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 Here also the Trojan triggering is based on a criterion. The criterion is encounter of 
either a particular state or sequence of states or after a particular number of encryptions. The 
Trojan after its trigger, transmits the amplitude modulated key through RF modulated unused 
pin as depicted in the figure. 
Original Output 
RF modulated Un 
used pin output 
 
TOP 
Original 
module 
Trojan 
Module 
Figure 4-3 TSC using unused pin for RF transmission  
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DoS (Denial of Service): 
 Hardware attacks that force to DoS operations implies that the operation of the 
device is affected such that the hardware Trojan either forces the device to function 
incorrectly or not at all to function. Such kinds of attacks are very serious and needs to be 
taken care. This is because in some critical applications in medicine like pacemaker in which 
battery life time should be long, this DoS Trojan will drain the battery soon and leads to the 
death of the patient. 
Leakage Current based TSC: 
 Trojan leaks the secret key through leakage current. The leakage circuit consists of a 
shift register and two inverters. Shift register holds the secret key. The LSB is connected to 
one inverter which is an input to the other inverter. When LSB of the shift register is „0‟, a 
path between power and ground is created by the PMOS of the first inverter and NMOS of 
the second inverter for a limited time. This increases the leakage current.  
 The attacker can easily determine the bits of key by measuring leakage current. The 
leakage circuit is common to all three benchmarks. Here the triggering criterion is either on 
the encounter of a particular state or particular sequence or after a particular number of 
encryptions. 
4.2.  POWER AND AREA ANALYSIS: 
 Twenty one AES benchmarks are analyzed for power and area using SYNOPSYS 
Design Compiler and are tabulated in the table. From the table it is evident that the area of 
Trojan free benchmark and the highest recorded area differ by 4941.348 square microns. 
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Table 4-2 Dynamic Power and Area of AES Benchmarks 
Benchmark 
Dynamic 
Power 
Power 
Delta Area 
Area 
Delta 
AES-T100 185.0515 0.5311 379917.728 636.828 
AES-T200 185.1306 0.6102 379936.448 655.548 
AES-T300 184.5204 0 379280.888 -0.01199 
AES-T400 184.7712 0.2508 380094.488 813.588 
AES-T500 184.5204 0 379280.888 -0.01199 
AES-T600 184.5315 0.0111 379408.328 127.428 
AES-T700 187.481 2.9606 384222.2482 4941.348 
AES-T800 187.3451 2.8247 384113.1681 4832.268 
AES-T900 185.004 0.4836 381290.048 2009.148 
AES-T1000 187.3202 2.7998 383795.2882 4514.388 
AES-T1100 184.9933 0.4729 384096.9682 4816.068 
AES-T1200 184.9933 0.4729 381311.648 2030.748 
AES-T1300 184.5068 -0.0136 379397.168 116.268 
AES-T1400 186.8748 2.3544 383387.0482 4106.148 
AES-T1500 184.5225 0.0021 380389.328 1108.428 
AES-T1600 187.6936 3.1732 384101.1282 4820.228 
AES-T1700 184.6342 0.1138 382709.528 3428.628 
AES-T1800 186.8379 2.3175 379280.888 -0.01199 
AES-T1900 184.5204 0 379280.888 -0.01199 
AES-T2000 184.5574 0.037 379694.888 413.988 
AES-T2100 184.5159 -0.0045 380477.168 1196.268 
Trojan Free Benchmark area: 379280.9 square microns 
Trojan Free Benchmark Dynamic Power:184.5204 milliwatt 
Power in milliwatt; Area in square microns; Delta: numerical difference between golden and 
trojan infected benchmark circuit 
 The Dynamic Power of Trojan Free benchmarks and the highest recorded power 
differ by 3.1732 mill-watt. In the present sub-micron technology with billions of gates and 
transistors the recorded difference is not that significant to decide the existence of HT. Also 
small changes in the design constraints will have effect on the area. Hence Area and Dynamic 
power analysis don‟t serve the purpose of Hardware Trojan detection. 
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Procedure and Flow of Power Analysis: 
 If a design is to banalyzeded for net switching power, cell internal power, and 
leakage power Synopsys Power Compileare useded. Using Power compiler, Power Analysis 
can be done at two levels of abstraction. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Switching activity from RTL or gate-level simulation is used for Gate-level Power 
Analysis. Analysis of a gate-level design requires a gate-level netlist and switching activity 
for it. Using Power Compiler one can determine the switching activity during RTL 
simulation. After captured activity on the design elements is annotated, switching activity is 
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RTL Design 
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Optimized Design 
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Gate-level 
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Figure 4-4 Power Analysis Flow 
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propagated through un-annotated portions of the design. Switching activity from RTL 
simulation is much faster than that of gate-level simulation. But the power taken from the 
RTL simulation is not that accurate. For much accuracy Power from gate-level simulation is 
apt. For more specific power analysis a tool called Prime Power from Synopsys is used. 
 In general all the steps are the part of Synopsys Design Compiler but power analysis 
requires generation of a SAIF file that is generated during simulation. In Power Optimization 
layer techniques such as operand isolation and clock gating are used. Power Optimization 
plays a prominent role in sub-micron technology where billions of transistors and gates were 
fabricated in a small area. Synthesis and Power Optimization phase is done in the Synopsys 
DC-shell by integration of Design Compiler with Power Compiler. Power at several corners 
for the gate-level design can be done and a detailed report will be generated. 
4.3.  STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF AES BENCHMARKS: 
Hardware Trojans based on CDMA: 
 AES-T100, AES-T200, AES-T700, AES-T800, AES-T900 AES-T1000, AES-T1100 
and AES-T1200 fall in this category. In AES-T100 and AES-T200 the Trojan is always on. 
In AES-T700 and AES-T1000 the Trojan gets triggered after the occurrence of a particular 
state. In AES-T800 and AES-T1100 the Trojan gets triggered after the occurrence of a 
particular sequence of states. IN AES-T900 and AES-T1200 the Trojan gets triggered after 
2
128
 number of encryptions. 
 This category of Trojans can‟t be detected in RTL verification as the functionality of 
the design is not at all affected due to the Trojan Side Channel. However, during DFT 
insertion, violations reported to asynchronous block will help suspecting the design. Upon 
properly identifying the suspicious blocks and removing them will pass the functional 
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coverage. Passing functional coverage will ensure us that the suspected block is a redundant 
malicious block.  
 All the asynchronous blocks reported are made synchronous for DFT (Design For 
Testability) insertion and pattern generation for stuck-at-faults and path-delay faults using 
ATPG (Automatic test Pattern Generator) of tetraMAX tool. The patterns generated by the 
ATPG are applied to the design that triggers the Trojan-trigger pin of the design by which the 
purpose of detection is served (Except AES-T100 and AES-T200). 
 Due to the asynchronous design of Trojan Side Channel block this class of Hardware 
Trojans even the bypass RTL verification gets detected during DFT insertion. 
Hardware Trojans that perform DoS: 
 AES-T500, AES-T1800 and AES-T1900 are of this kind. They use Shift register 
rotation logic to drain the power of the device. The Trojan when triggered will continuously 
shift the shift register outputs circularly so that the battery will drain fast. Here the triggering 
criterion is either on the encounter of a particular state or particular sequence or after a 
particular number of encryptions.  
 These benchmarks, however as they do not interfere with the functionality of AES, it 
passes RTL verification. But when these benchmarks are synthesized for gate-level netlist a 
blank module with no inputs and outputs will be created. If code coverage is exercised on the 
synthesized gate-level netlists, for whatever the input combinations may be the particular 
module with no inputs and outputs will go uncovered. Re-checking the module with no inputs 
and outputs will direct to a shift register that is rotating the key unnecessarily to drain the 
power. 
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 These benchmarks may be strong enough to pass the RTL verification, but are too 
weak as they get detected by synthesis followed by code coverage. 
Hardware Trojans based on Leakage current: 
 AES-T600, AES-T2000 and AES-T2100 fall in this category. These Benchmarks 
based on a Triggering criterion leaks the secret key through leakage current. A Shift Register 
followed by inverter stages does the trick. The attacker can easily determine the key by 
quantifying the leakage current. 
 The leakage circuit for all the three benchmarks is identical. Since the side channel 
doesn‟t merge with the operation of AES it goes undetected in RTL verification. Like a DoS 
kind of Trojans the leakage circuit here doesn‟t have outputs. Hence Synthesis of the RTL 
design fir gate-level netlist will leave a Verilog module with no inputs and outputs which 
ultimately gets detected in code coverage like DoS. A close observation of the uncovered 
module will lead us to the Leakage Circuit. 
 Like DoS kind these benchmarks are strong enough to pass RTL verification, but the 
Trojan gets detected by synthesis followed by code coverage. 
Hardware Trojans based on RF signal transmission: 
 AES-T400, AES-T1600 and AES-T1700 fall in this category. The data can be 
received at 1560 KHz with an AM radio. A single beep followed by a pause represents a „0‟ 
and a double beep followed by a pause represents „1‟.  
 Unused pin in a chip is always to be suspected. In this category also the Trojan Side 
channel operation doesn‟t disturb original AES and performs its malicious operation 
concurrently. It is observed that the toggle coverage of all pins is not up to the level of 
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satisfaction until the Trojan gets triggered. As soon as the Trojan gets triggered it gets easily 
detected in RTL verification that includes code coverage followed by functional coverage. 
Hardware Trojans based on the Dynamic Power Side channel: 
 AES-T1300, AES-T1400 and AES-T1500 fall in this category. The Trojan is 
designed such that it disturbs the key scheduling. The adversary intentionally introduces 
leaking states in the key schedule that depends upon known input bits and key bits. This does 
not occur during normal process.  
 The malicious behaviour in this category is that it leaks the key for every key 
schedule. The circuit that leaks the key is a shift register with ones and zeroes loaded 
alternately. Shift register gets enabled when the input to leakage circuit is logic „1‟, which 
results in additional consumption of dynamic power. The attacker decodes the power value to 
get the key. 
 This class of Trojans are strong enough to pass RTL verification as they do not 
disturb original AES operation. The lack of output port to the shift register leakage circuit 
will make the too weak to get detected in the synthesis phase itself. Similar to DoS and 
leakage current Trojans, this class of Trojans gets detected at the synthesis phase followed by 
code coverage. 
The Powerful benchmarks: 
 Here comes the category of powerful Trojans. The word “powerful” is used here in 
the context that the malicious behaviour of AES-T100 and AES-T200 benchmarks is too 
difficult to get detected using straight forward verification techniques. 
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 AES-T100 and AES-T200 passes all the standard verification process as their side 
channel is perfectly designed to bypass all the verification techniques. 
Table 4-3 Summary of Detection of AES Trojans 
SAF: Stuck-at-Faults; PDF: Path Delay Faults 
AES-T-B side-channel Detection Details Reason 
AES-T100 power Undetected 
Passes all standard 
verification tests 
AES-T200 power Undetected 
Passes all standard 
verification tests 
AES-T300 power Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T400 RF-Radio signal 
Detected for  toggle coverage at 
RTL verification 
extra pin suspicious 
AES-T500 
power-draining 
battery 
Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T600 leakage current Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T700 power 
Detected by patterns generated for 
SAF and PDF 
Async Block, functionally 
passing 
AES-T800 power 
Detected by patterns generated for 
SAF and PDF 
Async Block, functionally 
passing 
AES-T900 power 
Detected by patterns generated for 
SAF and PDF 
Async Block, functionally 
passing 
AES-T1000 power 
Detected by patterns generated for 
SAF and PDF 
Async Block, functionally 
passing 
AES-T1100 power 
Detected by patterns generated for 
SAF and PDF 
Async Block, functionally 
passing 
AES-T1200 power 
Detected by patterns generated for 
SAF and PDF 
Async Block, functionally 
passing 
AES-T1300 
power, leakage ckt, 
XOR 
Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T1400 
power, leakage ckt, 
XOR 
Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T1500 power Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T1600 RF-Radio signal 
Detected for  toggle coverage at 
RTL verification 
extra pin suspicious 
AES-T1700 RF-Radio signal 
Detected for  toggle coverage at 
RTL verification 
extra pin suspicious 
AES-T1800 
power-draining 
battery 
Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T1900 
power-draining 
battery 
Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T2000 leakage current Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
AES-T2100 leakage current Detected at synthesis stage Lack of output pin 
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The summary of all the AES benchmarks and their detection status are tabulated in the table. 
The table clearly depicts all the benchmarks with their detection details and reason for their 
detection. From all the analysis done on the twenty one AES benchmarks taken from trust-
hub, it can be concluded that Except AES-T100 and AES-T200 all other benchmarks get 
detected for standard verification techniques in ASIC. AES-T100 and AES-T200 go 
undetected at all stages of verification flow because the Trojans are designed in synchronous 
with the original design, doesn‟t affect the functionality of the original design and also 
possesses output port that avoids it get detected at synthesis level. 
4.4. RSA TROJAN BENCHMARKS:  
 Three RSA Trojan Benchmarks with various malicious behaviours are taken from 
trust-hub for analysis and detection of Trojans inserted in them using existing conventional 
Hardware Trojan detection techniques. The description of three RSA benchmarks is tabulated 
in the table 4-4 
Table 4-4 RSA Trojan benchmarks description 
Benchmark Malicious 
behaviour  
Description 
RSA-T100 Leaks Info 
Whenever the input plain text is 32‟h44444444 the output cypher text is 
replaced by secret key. 
RSA-T200 DoS 
Whenever a predefined input plain text occurs the in-exponent value is 
replaced with dummy value to perform DoS 
RSA-T300 Leaks Info 
After certain count value the Trojan triggers and replaces the cypher with 
secret in-exponent key 
RSA-T400 
Leaks info 
and DoS 
After certain count value the Trojan replaces the secret key with a dummy 
value and leaks secret in-exponent key 
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DoS: Denial of Service 
Based on the action characteristics the benchmarks possess malicious behaviour is that they 
either leak info of perform denial of service operation. RSA-T100 and RSA-T300 fall into the 
category of leak info and RSA-T200 and RSA-T400 falls in the category of DoS. A detailed 
description of these hardware Trojans is presented in the later section in this thesis. 
4.5. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF RSA BENCHMARKS 
RSA Benchmarks that leak info: 
 The Trojans under this category leaks confidential info to the adversary. In this case 
the confidential info is either private key or in-exponent. 
 For the case of RSA-T100, the benchmark is designed such that the Trojan leaks the 
private key after a predefined input plain text is encountered. For input plain text of 
32‟h44444444 the Trojan will replace the output cypher text with the secret private key and 
serves the purpose of the adversary. 
 The behaviour of the RSA-T300 Trojan benchmark is similar to RSA-T100 but 
differs slightly in its activation mechanism. In this benchmark design, the adversary has 
incorporated a counter and the counter is initialized to zero. The counter count value is 
sensitive to the reset and data select pin. As soon as the counter‟s count value reaches to two, 
the benchmark enables its malicious behaviour by replacing the output cypher text with the in 
exponent to perform Denial of Service operation. 
The corresponding simulation waveforms are shown in the figures. 
 
49 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Simulation waveforms of RSA-T100 for no Trojan  
 The simulation diagram in the fig is for un-triggered Trojan. The Trojan is in-active 
as the input is 32‟h00724183, a hexadecimal plain text for which the Trojan doesn‟t trigger. 
Hence the cypher text generated is flaw-less. It is known that the Trojan is active for input 
plain text of 32‟h444444444 hexadecimal plain text. 
 Trojan Detection in RSA-T100:  
 The Trojan inserted in RSA-T100 can be detected in RTL verification itself because 
it is directly affecting the functionality of RSA module. 
 
Figure 4-6 Coverage report for RSA-T100  
 And hence for whatever may the input combinations achieving maximum 
coverage is impossible as at any instance at least if-condition fails and corresponding block 
coverage, condition coverage, expression and statement coverage will be affected. 
 Also the Trojan gets detected for the patterns generated by ATPG tool for Stuck-
at-fault. The corresponding simulation waveforms are shown in figure. 
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Figure 4-7 RSA-T100 Trojan triggered for pattern generation for SAF  
 
4.6. Trojan Detection in RSA-T300:  
 In this benchmark the Trojan gets triggered after a particular count sequence value is 
brought up to two. Corresponding simulation waveforms of the benchmark are depicted in the 
figure for triggered Trojan. 
 
Figure 4-8 RSA-T300 simulation waveforms for Trojan triggered  
 In the figure it is evident that, after some duration of time the cypher output is 
replaced with in-exponent. However this goes undetected at synthesis stage and pattern 
generation for SAF and PDF.  
 The Trojan inserted directly affects the functionality of the original RSA design 
and hence it gets detected for RTL verification. Standard verification metrics can easily 
detect this kind of Trojans. 
Hence RSA-T100 and RSA-T300 benchmarks get detected for RTL verification. Thereby it 
is concluded that these benchmarks are weak.  
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RSA Benchmarks that perform DoS operation: 
 RSA-T200 falls in this category. The Trojan in this benchmark intentionally disturbs 
the original operation to perform denial of service operation. 
 The malicious block in this benchmark is designed such that on occurrence of a 
predefined input plain text the in-exponent value is replaced with a dummy value which is 
used in various evaluations required for cypher text  calculations. The simulation waveform 
with Trojan triggered is shown in figure. 
 
Figure 4-9 Simulation waveforms of RSA-T200 with active Trojan  
 From the input 32‟01FA0301, the Trojan gets triggered and replaces the in-
exponent value that in-turn alters the output cypher text. 
Trojan Detection in RSA-T200:  
 The Trojan in this benchmark also alters the functionality of the original RSA and 
hence basic RTL verification can serve the purpose of detection. However this goes 
undetected at synthesis level and pattern generation for SAF and PDF as the Trojan is in 
synchronous with the original design. 
 In this benchmark the Trojan triggers for a predefined input and hence simple 
code coverage can easily detect the Trojan existence. 
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Figure 4-4-40 Coverage report for RSA-T200 
 The Coverage report clearly depicts that for whatever may be the input 
combinations, a condition in the Trojan module will be left uncovered as it is dependent on 
occurrence of a predefined input. 
RSA Benchmarks that perform Leak info and DoS operation: 
 RSA-T400 falls in this category. When Trojan is triggered it replaces the in-exponent 
to perform the DoS and leaks the original secret in-exponent value. The corresponding 
simulation waveforms for active Trojan is shown in the figure. 
 
Figure 4-11 Simulation waveforms of RSA-T400 with active Trojan  
 From the figure it is evident that after the count value is brought up to two, the 
Trojan starts its malicious task of replacing the cypher with in-exponent and the cypher text 
will be replaced with original in-exponent value so that it performs both leakage of secret 
information and DoS operation as well. 
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Trojan Detection in RSA-T200:  
 This kind of Trojans bypasses detection at synthesis stage as the Trojan structure 
is perfectly organised to be synchronous with clock signal. Also it goes undetected for pattern 
generation for SAF and PDF. 
  However the issue with this benchmark is that it gets traced at RTL 
verification as the Trojan directly intervenes with the functionality of the original RSA 
benchmark. A perfectly written assertion based control oriented data coverage or data 
oriented coverage would serve the purpose of Trojan detection in this case.   
On a whole all the RSA benchmarks taken form the trust-hub are not that powerful Trojans as 
they get detected at standard verification metrics like code coverage and functional coverage. 
Overall summary of these benchmarks is tabulated in the table. 
Table 4-5 RSA Trojan benchmarks overall detection summary 
Benchmark 
Detection Status 
Synthesis SAF/PDF RTL verification 
RSA-T100 NO YES YES 
RSA-T200 NO NO YES 
RSA-T300 NO NO YES 
RSA-T400 NO NO YES 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. DESIGN OF NOVEL AES TROJAN BENCHMARKS 
 
5.1. EXISTING DIFFICULTY 
5.2. PROPOSED NOVEL BENCHMARK DESIGN 
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5.1.  EXISTING DIFFICULTY: 
 From all the analysis done so far it is clear that almost all AES benchmark 
designs are weak enough to get detected in any of the standard verification technique. Hence 
there is a necessity for developing a novel hardware Trojan benchmark that bypasses all the 
Standard Trojan Verification techniques. 
 To achieve this task of designing a novel benchmark which is strong enough to 
pass the verification tests, a weakest Trojan class of all among the twenty-one benchmarks is 
selected. The weakest classes here imply that they even get detected at synthesis level which 
makes them too weak designs.  
 Hence Trojans based on Denial of service DoS, leakage current and dynamic 
power are taken and are re-designed to eliminate the weaknesses associated with them. The 
weakness associated with these benchmarks is that lack of output pin which lead to a blank 
Verilog module with no input and output gets created during synthesis that on further 
subjected to code coverage will do the job of Trojan detection.  
 To overcome the detection the design is to be altered such that output port is to be 
added to the design. Addition of output port is not as simple as it appears to be because the 
output port added to the TSC module should not affect the original output of the TOP (AES 
and TSC) module. 
Before that a detailed study of the DoS based Trojan benchmark is presented in the later 
sections. To illustrate the idea, AES-T500 benchmark is taken as reference. The simulation 
result of AES-T500 trojan inserted benchmark, for both Triggered and un-triggered states,  is 
shown in the figure.  
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Figure 5-5-1 Simulation waveforms of AES-T500 for un-triggered Trojan  
 
Figure 5-5-2 Simulation waveforms of AES-T500 for Triggered Trojan  
 The simulation wave for shown in figure corresponds to that for un-triggered 
Trojan. The pin Tj_Trig is the one that actually depicts the status of the Trojan that whether 
the Trojan is in triggered state or un-triggered state. For this particular benchmark design, the 
context for which the Trojan triggers is occurrence of a predefined sequence of 128-bit plain 
text at the state input. If once the sequence not as pre-designed then the Trojan remains un-
triggered that is shown in figure. 
 Trojan Structure:  
 The Trojan structure is that, it is a 128-bit shift-register. The shift-register 
structure here is not at all a part of AES design. It is a redundant block. The shift-register is 
initialized with an appropriate output value of 128-bit. In this case it is 
128‟haaaa_aaaa_aaaa_aaaa_aaaa_aaaa_aaaa_aaaa. The malicious action of the shift-register 
circuit is that up on the commencement of predefined sequence of states at the input of the 
AES, the Tj_Trig pin immediately goes high and the shift-register starts to shift the data 
circularly. The malicious operation once started doesn‟t get terminated until unless the 
condition for the Tj_Trig pin to go low occurs. 
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Figure 5-5-3 The structure of Trojan in AES-T500 benchmark  
 The design of Trojan block in AES-T500 is shown in figure. In addition with 
AES benchmark the malicious block that is accessing the state input, clock input, key input 
and reset input. The rotating shift-register is designed in ring counter style. 
 This class of Trojans are very weak as they can be detected at synthesis level of 
abstraction itself. This is because of lack of output pin for the TSC module. A simple solution 
that hits is addition of output pin to design would serve the purpose of bypassing the 
synthesis phase. But the problem here is addition of additional pin should not affect the 
output of the top module. This is because if the added extra port disturbs the original output, 
the Trojan will be weak enough to get identified at RTL verification stage.  Hence the 
addition should be designed in such a way that any result of the outcome that results in 
altering the original output should be nullified. 
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5.2.  PROPOSED NOVEL BENCHMARK DESIGN: 
 A Novel AES benchmark design is proposed for the classes of DoS, Leakage 
Current and Dynamic Power based Trojan designs so that they bypasses all standard 
verification methods of Trojan detection. Especially the synthesis phase is to be bypassed as 
they get caught at this level of abstraction due to lack of output pin. 
 
Figure 5-4 Proposed structure of Trojan Benchmark design for DoS, Leakage 
Current and Dynamic Power classes.  
 The proposed design is actually the modification of the existing design 
incorporating necessary changes. The key idea here is to add an output pin to the design and 
incorporate a multiplexer whose inputs are the outputs of AES module and TSC module‟s 
newly added output. The output pin is of size 128-bit and the output is actually the output of 
the Rotating Shift Register (RSR). 
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 The select line used to the multiplexer is the newly added output of the TSC 
module. The multiplexer logic here is to select the output of AES for all values of select line 
except for zero. The select line which is output of TSC module will never go zero and hence 
the purpose of un-altered original output value is satisfied. 
 
Figure 5-5 Simulation waveforms of proposed novel design  
 The simulation waveforms of the proposed design is show in figure from the 
figure it is evident that the output value doesn‟t change due to added output to the TSC 
module due to multiplexer with one of the inputs and select line as the output of the Rotating 
Shift Register. This new benchmark design doesn‟t get detected at synthesis level die to 
added output port and also standard verification techniques like code coverage and functional 
coverage cannot detect the Trojan in them as the AES inside it is functionally unaltered. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6. CONCLUSION AND SCOPE OF FUTURE WORK: 
 
6.1. CONCLUSION 
6.2. FUTURE WORK 
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6.1. CONCLUSION: 
 After a detailed post-mortem of the twenty one AES Trojan benchmarks taken from 
the repository of trust-hub, it is very clear that the Trojan designs are not that effective to 
bypass the standard verification techniques. As a matter of fact except Always on Trojans all 
the other class of Trojan designs gets caught somehow at any level of abstraction easily.  
 All the Trojan benchmarks were subjected to DFT insertion and pattern generation 
using ATPG, RTL verification for all the benchmarks was done. As no benchmark is directly 
affecting the functionality of the original AES design it is very difficult to write a powerful 
assertion based test benches. Hence these Trojan benchmarks bypass RTL verification. In 
case of RSA benchmarks as the Trojan designs are directly intervening in the functional 
operation, the gets easily detected for RTL verification. 
Table 6-1 Trojan Category and its strength 
Serial no. Side Channel Category Strength 
1 CDMA Based WEAK 
2 RF Transmission based WEAK 
3 Leakage Current Based WEAK 
4 DoS Based WEAK 
5 Always on Category STRONG 
 
Each and every AES Trojan benchmark is associated with certain weakness that leads 
to their detection. From all the work carried out the benchmarks are too weak enough to get 
caught in case of ASIC. However for a good Trojan designer, his malicious blocks should not 
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get caught elsewhere. A fruitful attempt was made in order to overcome the weaknesses of 
AES benchmarks out of which the categories of Dynamic Power, leakage current and DoS 
were successfully redesigned and the designs were subjected to existing standard verification 
metrics and got assurance that the designs will never get caught for the standard verification 
metrics known to the best of my knowledge. Due to lack of time the work is not extended for 
the other categories like CDMA based Trojans and RF transmission based Trojans. 
6.2. FUTURE WORK: 
 The work done so far is with respect to Application Specific Integrated Circuit ASIC 
design flow. The work can be extended to verify the strengths and weaknesses of AES 
benchmarks and RSA benchmarks with respect to Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). 
Also various Trojan defense architectures can be incorporated in these benchmarks to thwart 
the malicious behaviour. 
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